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NOTES
The Impact of Michigan's Common-Law Disabilities of Coverture on Married Women's Access to Credit
In the United States, credit is indispensable to the improvement
of one's economic status and life style. 1 Its availability often dictates •the extent to which one has access to education, homeownership, entrepreneurship, and investment, 2 and its unobtainability inhibits full participation in the activities and opportunities of American society. American women have long been systematically excluded from equal access to credit by lending institutions of all types 3
and ·thus have been denied their rightful role in the economic life
of the country. It is only recently, however, that the women's movement has begun to focus attention on credit discrimination4 and that
the legal6 and financial 8 communities, the government, 7 and the general public8 have recognized the problems encountered by women
seeking to obtain credit.
A number of states,9 as well as the federal government, 10 have
responded by enacting laws .to ensure equal credit opportunity. In
1974, Michigan joined these states by adopting an equal credit opportunity act that prohibits discrimination "on the basis of race, color,
1. See Brown, The Discredited American Woman: Sex Discrimination in Consumer Credit, 6 U. CAL. DAVIS L REv. 61 (1973).
2. Gates, Credit Discrimination Against Women: C-auses and Solutions, 27 VAND.
L. REV. 409, 410 (1974).
3. .See NATIONAL CoMMISSION ON CoNSUMER FINANCE, REPORT-CONSUMER
CREI>rr IN nm UNITED STATES 152 (1972) [hereinafter NCCF REPORT].
4. See, e.g., K. DECRow, SEXIST JUSTICE 3-139 (1974).
5. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 1; Gates, supra note 2; Littlefield, Sex-Based Discriminalion and Credit Granting Practices, 5 CoNN. L REv. 575 (1973); Comment,
Credit Equality for the California Woman?, 3 U. SAN FERN. VALLEY L REv. 125
(1974).
6. See, e.g., Women Win More Credit, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 12, 1974, at 76:7. See, e.g., NCCF REPORT, supra note 3, at 152-53.
8. See, e.g., Women Battle Bias, TIME, June 4, 1973, at 80; Who Gets the
Credit?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1972, at 69.
9. See Gates, supra note 2, at 436.
10. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1691-91e (Supp. Feb.
1975), makes it "unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant on
the basis of sex or marital status with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction."
15 U.S.C.A. § 1691 (Supp. Feb. 1975). It provides for civil liability including punitive damages and sets a maximum recovery of $10,000 in an individual suit and a
maximum total recovery in a class action of $100,000 or one per cent of the net
worth of the creditor, whichever is less. 15 U.S.C.A. § 169le (Supp. Feb. 1975),
These provisions took effect one year from the Oct. 28, 1974, date of enactment.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1691 note (Supp. Feb. 1975).

76

77

November 19751

religion, national origin, marital status, sex or physical handicap" in
the granting of loans, the extending of credit, or the rating of a person's creditworthiness.11 The statute provides both criminal and
civil sanctions and ensures a minimum recovery in civil cases of $200
in addition to court costs and attorney fees. Under this new legislation creditors presumably can no longer, on grounds of sex or marital status alone, discount a woman's income, force her to seek credit
in her husband's name, or deny her credit altogether.
Although laws such as Michigan's should effectively eliminate
credit limitations based upon sexually discriminatory assumptions
about the creditworthiness of women, other obstacles impede .the attainment of equal credit opportunity. In a number of states, including Michigan, there remain common-law disabilities of coverture that
limit the capacity of married women to contraot12 and hence their
ability to obtain credit from lenders understandably hesitant to deal
with those not legally bound to repay debts. Significantly, -the federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act permits credit discrimination to
the extent that state laws limit the ability of married women to contract.18
11. No. 246, {1974] Mich. Pub. & Local Acts- (codified at MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 750.147a (Supp. 1975) ). This act provides:
( 1) A person shall not discriminate in extending credit or granting a loan
on the basis of
color, religion, national origin, marital status, sex or physical handicap unless that person:
(a) Is a non-profit corporation whose members share the same:
(i) Racial, religious, ethnic, marital or sexual characteristic;
or
(ii) Physical handicap; or
(iii) Blend of these characteristics and
(b) Extends credit or grants a loan only to its members.
(2) A person shall not discriminate in the rating of a person's credit
worthiness on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, marital status,
sex, or physical handicap.
(3) A person who violates the provisions of subsections (1) or (2) is
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000.00.
(4) A person who violates the provisions of subsection (1) or (2) shall
be liable in a civil action to the injured party for the amount of (a) $200.00
or (b) damages, whichever is greater. Actions brought pursuant to rule 208 of
the general court rules of 1963 shall be limited to those damages provided in
subsection (4)(b). The prevailing party in the civil action shall be entitled to
recover court costs and reasonable attorney fees. The right of action under this
subsection shall be unassignable.
12. See L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 52-59 (1969).
13. 15 U.S.C.A. § 169ld(b) (Supp. Feb. 1975) ("Consideration or application
of State property laws directly or indirectly affecting creditworthiness shall not constitute discrimination for purposes of this subchapter"). In its report on the Act,
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs indicated that "if an
applicant does not have and control his or her own income or assets which can
clearly be used as a source of repayment, denial of credit would be based on proper
credit criteria and the concept of discrimination would be inapplicable." S. REP. No.
93-278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1973) (emphasis original). The Committee .added
that it recognized "that, because of the laws of certain States, creditors or card issuers
may deem certain women less creditworthy than other women or than men in otherwise similar circumstances . • . . The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

race,
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Although existing disabilities may impair the equal access to
credit otherwise guaranteed by the federal act, it is not certain what
their effect wil be under Michigan's new equal credit law. This
Note will examine the history of Michigan's law of coverture to determine the extent to which contractual disabilities remain. Specifically, consideration will be given to the common law of coverture,
the changes effected by the Michigan Married Women's Property
Act, 14 and the impact of the 1963 Michigan constitution. The Note
will then analyze both the influence of the remaining disabilities
upon a married woman's access to credit and the effect of the new
Michigan equal credit act upon those disabilities.
Under the common law of England a single woman, or feme sole,
became known to the law upon her marriage as a feme cover1. 1 ri
During the period of her marriage (or coverture) she lost many of
her rights to ownership and control of property.16 As Blackstone
stated, "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law;
that is, ·the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into
that of the husband."17
In Michigan,18 as in all the American common-law states,111 the
English law of coverture was adopted. As a result, the legal effect
of marriage upon women in Michigan was profound. 20 A married
woman "could neither possess nor manage property in her own right.
21
• • ."
The husband became the owner of all personal property
either owned by the wife before marriage or acquired by her thereSystem shall promulgate regulations to insure non-discriminatory extension of credit
in the context of our Federal system that gives recognition to each State's system
of law." Id. at 20. Regulations promulgated under the Act now provide: "Consideration or application of State property laws directly or indirectly affecting creditworthiness shall not constitute discrimination for purposes of this Part." 40 Fed. Reg.
49,308 (1975) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(1) ).
14. MICH. CoMP. LAWS§§ 557.1-.55 (1970).
15. Covert means covered, protected, sheltered. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 439
(rev. 4th ed. 1968). The term feme covert indicates a wife's status vis-a-vis her
husband.
lo. Johnston, Ser and Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law School
Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 41 N.Y.U. L. RBv. 1033, 1045-46
(1972).
17. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
18. Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184, 188-89 (Mich. 1845).
19. Johnston, supra note 16, at 1058.
20. The two leading Michigan cases on the common law of coverture are Burdeno
v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 90 (1866), and Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60 (1866). Although both construed the law as it existed following the 1855 Married Women's Act,
their complete outlines of the legal effecls of marriage on women before the Act have
been cited as authoritative statemen~ of the Michigan common law of coverture. See,
e.g., Sierra v. Minnear, 341 Mich. 182, 185, 67 N.W.2d 115, 116 (1954).
21. Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 90, 92 (1866).
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after. 22 He had the right to reduce her choses in action to possession, 28 to possess and control her real property and all her earnings,24
and, if children were born, to retain a life estate in all of her real
property. 25 The wife had no power to contract, to sue, or even to
be sued in her own name. 26 "In short," as the Michigan supreme
court stated, "she lost entirely all the legal incidents attaching to a
person acting in her own right. The husband alone remained sui
juris, as fully as before marriage." 27
In 1839, states began to make statutory changes in the common
law of coverture to grant married women increased legal rights. 28
These acts, which eventually became law in all states, were not, however, part of a coherent program to abolish the law of coverture
and grant equal rights to married women. Even minor changes in
the law of coverture were effected only after overcoming considerable legislative resistance. 29 As a result, reform legislation was enacted in a piecemeal fashion over a number of years.80
The history of the law of coverture in Michigan reflects a similar
pattern. The Married Women's Property Act, which remains in effect today, is in fact a series of three statutes enacted in 1855,81
22. Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60, 66 (1866).
23. Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60, 66 (1866). Although a chose in action did
not become the husband's arid would revert to the wife at the end of the marriage,
the husband had the right to sue before the end of the marriage to reduce the chose
in action to possession. He was not accountable to his wife for property thus received. See Johnston, supra note 16, at 1045, n.34.
24. Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60, 66 (1866).
25. Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60, 66 (1866). Upon marriage the husband obtained an interest, known as jure uxoris, in his wife's real property. Although the
wife did regain the property at the end of the marriage and the husband could not
alienate the property, the husband did not have to account to the wife for the rents
and profits derived from the property during the marriage. The husband's interest
in the property was alienable and subject to attachment by creditors. Any real property transferred to the wife after marriage became subject to jure uxoris. See Johnston, supra note 16, at 1045.
26. Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 90, 92 (1866).
27. Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 90, 92 (1866).
28. Mississippi was the first state to enact a married women's statute. See generally Note, Husband and Wife-Memorandum on the Mississippi Woman's Law of
1839, 42 MICH. L. RE.v. 1110 (1944). New York's initial married women's statute,
enacted in 1848, was the first such law to gain widespread attention. See Johnston,
supra note 16, at 1064.
29. See Johnston, supra note 16, at 1063-67. Johnston describes the resistance
with which New York legislators met each proposal for change. It took years for
legislators to abandon attitudes similar to those held by the New York lawmaker who
quoted Thomas Jefferson's remark "that it was owing to the separate interest of wife
and husband in France that about half the annual increase of the population of Paris
was illegitimate." Id. at 1064.
30. Id. at 1061-62. In addition, the states progxessed at different rates in granting rights to women. Id. Connecticut, for example, did not grant to married women
the right to control their own property until 1877,. almost 30 years after New York
had done so. Id. at 1068.
31. No. 168, {1S55] Mich. Acts. 420. The first married women's act in Michi-
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1911,32 and 1917.33 Each statute eliminated some of the disabilities
of coverture by granting to married women limited legal rights. The
Married Women's Act of 1855 was the broadest grant of rights and
had the most significant effect on the ability of married women to
contract. The Act permitted a married woman to hold property in
her own name, prohibited its attachment for her husband's debts,
and allowed her to transfer her property. 8 i In addition, it authorized a married woman to contract with relation to her separate estate. 35 The statute thus effected an important change in the legal
status of a married woman by permitting her to accumulate and retain an estate separate from that of her husband and to contract with
relation to it. All of the legal rights established by the Act, however,
dealt specifically with a married woman's separate estate. It granted
a married woman the right to hold property separately and only such
additional rights as were necessary to keep her separate property
free from her husband's creditors. 36 Thus, rather than grant equalgan, passed in 1844, was absorbed into the 1855 statute, The 1844 statute, "An Act
To Defin!! and Protect the Rights of Married Women," provided that
any estate, real or personal, which may have been acquired by any female before
her marriage, either by her own personal industry or by inheritance, gift, grant
or devise, or to which she may at any time hereafter be entitled by inheritance,
gift, grant, or devise, and the rents, issues, profits and income thereof, shall be
and continue the real and personal estate of such female after marriage to the
same extent as before marriage, and none of said property shall be liable for
her husband's debts or engagements, but such property shall be liable for all the
debts of the wife contracted prior to marriage.
No. 66, (1844] Mich. Acts. 77.
32. No. 196, (1911] Mich. Pub. Acts 330.
33. No. 158, ,[1917] Mich. Pub. Acts. 287.
34. MICH. COMP. LAws § 557.1 (1970):
ff]he real and personal estate of every female acquired before marriage, and
all property, real and personal, to which she may afterwards become entitled,
by gift, grant, inheritance, devise, or in any other manner, shall be and remain
the estate and property of such female, and shall not be liable for the debts,
obligations and engagements of her husband, and may be contracted, sold, trans·
ferred, mortgaged, conveyed, devised or bequeathed by her, in the same manner
and with the like effect as if she were unmarried.
Section 2 of the Act allows a person holding property as trustee for a married
woman to convey the property to the woman's separate estate. MICH. COMP. L\ws
§ 557.2 (1970). Under the common law, one method through which married women
could prevent their husbands from getting control over their property was by placing
it in trust. Johnston, supra note 16, at 1052-53. Thus, this section allows the trustee
to convey property baok to the married woman.
35. MICH. CoMP. L\ws § 557.4 (1970):
The husband of any married woman shall not be liable to be sued upon any
contract made by such married woman in relation to her sole property, and the
wife shall be liable to be sued upon any contradt or engagement made by her
in cases where her husband is not in law liable, or where he refuses to perform
such contract or engagement, and in any case herein authorized, the cause of
action shall be deemed to have acurred [accrued] from and after the passage
of this act.
36. At the same time, there was concern over the possibility of defrauding creditors by placing the husband's property in the wife's separate estate, Therefore, in
order to retain her separate interest in property, a married woman was required to
avoid commingling it with that of her husband. See Glover v. Alcott, 11 Mich, 470,
479 (1863).
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ity, the Act sought to protect a married woman's property from predation by her husband.
In accord with the Act's purpose, the contractual powers it
granted37 were limited to agreements directly relating to a married
woman's separate estate. 38 In interpreting the effect of the 1855
statute, the Michigan supreme court emphasized that a married
woman has "no general capacity to contract. She can only make
such contracts as relate to her own property, while in regard to that
she has very full powers." 89 Kenton Insurance Co. v. McClellan40
illustrates -the limited powers that the Act granted. The case was
brought against a married woman on a promissory note that she had
given to her son to use as security for one of his debts. The court,
upholding the woman's defense that the contract did not relate to
her separate estate, stated: "It has been uniformly held by this
court that our statutes do not authorize a married woman to become
personally liable on an executory promise except concerning her separate estate. A note given for any other consideration is void." 41
The Michigan court recognized three ways in which a contract
may relate to a married woman's separate estate. The primary way
was if the contractual consideration went directly to her separate
estate.42 This represented the most significant expansion of married
women's contractual rights and provided the foundation for married
women to obtain property for themselves on their own credit. A
contract was also found to relate to a married woman's separate estate if she had agreed to pay for services, such as medical treatment,
from which she derived a personal benefit. 48 The final way in which
a married woman was permitted to contract was for services rendered to a person for whom she was legally responsible when such
services were required by the scope of her responsibility. Thus, a
married woman could contract with a doctor to provide medical care
to her children. 44 Under a strict construction of the 1855 Act, these
last two types of contracts would not seem to relate to a married
woman's separate estate since they have no real effect on her property. Although the Michigan court did not articulate the basis of
its expansive interpretation of the phrase "separate estate," it seems
37. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 557.4 (1970), quoted in note 35 supra.
38. See Florer, The Contracts of Married Women in Michigan, 4 MICH. ST. B.J.
*99, *103 (1925).
39. West v. Laraway, 28 Mich. 464,465 (1874).
40. 43 Mich. 564, 6 N.W. 88 (1880).
41. 43 Mich. at 565, 6 N.W. at 88.
42. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Parent, 152 Mich. 587, 116 N.W. 367 (1908); Tillman
v. Shaokleton, 15 Mich. 447 (1~67) (married woman held liable for purchase of furniture to be used by her in running her own business).
43. See, e.g., Barber v. Eberle's Estate, 131 Mich. 317, 91 N.W. 123 (1902).
44. See, e.g., Goodman v. Shipley, 105 Mich. 439, 63 N.W. 412 (1895).
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reasonable 10 conclude that the court was motivated by practical considerations. It was able to extend to married women additional
useful rights without altering the protective nature of the Act.
Only in these three specific areas were married women permitted to contract by the 1855 Act. The Michigan supreme court
stressed that the "statute has not removed all the common-law disabilities of a married woman. It has not made her sui juris, or conferred upon her the powers of a f eme sole, except in certain directions."45 The court was careful in its interpretation of the Act to
avoid holding a married woman liable on a contract not for her benefit. Thus, in Buck v. Haynes Estate, 46 the promise of a married
woman to pay for medical services rendered to her husband was held
not to be binding on the grounds that the debt was her husband's
and that she did not have the legal capacity to assume the debt without some consideration running to her separate estate. 47 Even when
there was consideration running to the married woman's separate estate, the court would not hold her liable unless she had personally
agreed to the arrangement. Therefore, in Detroit Lumber Co. v.
Cleff, 48 the court held that a wife was not, upon her husband's insolvency, liable for improvements to her property contracted for by her
husband. The court viewed the statute not as emancipatory, but
rather as strictly protective and interpreted the act as granting to a
married woman a shield with which to avoid liability for the debts
of others, particularly her husband's. This attitude is clearly demonstrated by the court's rejection, in Artman v. Ferguson, 40 of a partnership between a wife and her husband. The court stated:
[I]t is the purpose of these statutes to secure to a married woman the
right to acquire and hold property separate from her husband, and
free from his influence and control, and if she might enter into a business partnership with her husband it would subject her property to his
control in a manner wholly inconsistent with the separation which it
is the purpose of the statute to secure, and might subject her to an indefinite liability for his engagements. 60
It is apparent that the court believed the Act protected a married
45. Howe v. North, 69 Mich. 272, 284, 37 N.W. 213, 219 ( 1888).
46. 75 Mich. 397, 42 N.W. 949 (1889).
47. Compare text at note 44 supra. One significant exception to the Buck rule
was that a married woman could make an express charge on her own property by
mortgaging it to secure the payment of another's obligation since the 1855 Act authorized her to sell or mortgage her property. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 557.1 (1970),
quoted in note 34 supra. See, e.g., Marx v. Belle!, 114 Mich. 631, 72 N.W. 620
(1897), where a creditor was allowed to foreclose on the mortgage of a piano belonging to a married woman who had encumbered it to secure her husband's business
debts.
48. 164 Mich. 276, 128 N.W. 231 (1910). See also Lesher v. Brosteau, 238
Mich. 189, 197, 213 N.W. 163, 166 (1927).
49. 73 Mich. 146, 40 N.W. 907 (1888).
50. 73 Mich. at 150, 40 N.W. at 909.
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woman by allowing her to contract only with regard to her separate
estate. Thus, in the court's view, it was for the benefit of a married
woman that "[i]n all other respects she is a femme-covert, and subject to all the restraints and disabilities consequent upon that relation."51
The Michigan court, in furtherance of its protectivist interpretation of the Act, also imposed procedural burdens upon any party
seeking to enforce a contract against a married woman. It required
affirmative proof by a plaintiff that the consideration went to the
married woman's separate estate. 52 Emphasizing that "there is
never any presumption of validity of such an undertaking, whether
negotiable or not, and that proof must always be given of such a consideration as will bind her," the court stated, "We think the rule must
apply whether value received is expressed or not, because -the power
is not general but statutory, and cannot be extended beyond the constitutional and statutory limits." 118
In Fechheimer v. Peirce, 54 the plaintiff sued a married woman
on a note that, it was alleged, she had signed as principal and her
husband had signed as surety. The husband had filled out the loan
application and picked up the check, which was made out to the
wife. When sued, the wife denied knowledge of the loan. The
court concluded that the fact that the check was made payable to
the wife's order, when delivered to the husband without her authority, "was not very significant" and, as a matter of law, "amounted
to no proof of a loan to her." 55 By thus placing such a heavy burden
of proof upon the plaintiff, the court reaffirmed its analysis of the
1855 Act as a protective measure. 56
The limited rights granted to married women by the 1855 Act
were thus narrowly interpreted by the Michigan court. Where the
Act did not apply, the common-law rule that a contract made by
a married woman was void57 continued in force. 58 Thus, a married
woman could neither sue nor be sued on a contract beyond the scope
51. 73 Mich. at 148-49, 40 N.W. at 908.
52. See West v. Laraway, 28 Mich. 464,467 (1879).
53 .. Kenton Ins. Co. v. McClellan, 43 Mich. 564,565, 6 N.W. 88, 88 (1880).
54. 70 Mich. 440, 38 N.W. 325 (1888).
55. 70 Mich. at 442, 38 N.W. at 326.
56. Although Fechheimer was seemingly disregarded in National Lumberman's
Bank v. Miller, 131 Mich. 564, 91 N.W. 1024 (1902), the Michigan court reaffirmed it in Judd v. Judd, 187 Mich. 612, 154 N.W. 31 (1915), and, more recently,
in Koengeter v. Holzbaugh, 332 Mich. 280, 50 N.W.2d 778 (1952) and Montz v.
Reuter, 268 Mich. 357,256 N.W. 351 (1934).
57. See Note, Contracts-Liability of Married Woman on Promissory Note, 5
MICH. ST. B.J. *125 (1926).
58. See Judd v. Judd, 187 Mich. 612, 615, 154 N.W. 31, 32 (1915). See generally Koengeter v. Holzbaugh, 332 Mich. 280, 50 N.W.2d 778 (1952); Florer, supra
note 38, at * 11 I; VanSyckle, Some Phases of the Michigan Law Relating to Husband
and Wife, l DBT. L. REV. 13, 17 (1931).
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of the 1855 Act, 59 even if the contract were a negotiable instrument
in the possession of a holder in due course. 60
One of the many disabilities of coverture left unaffected by the
1855 Act was the common-law right of the husband to his wife's
services. Since the husband possessed the right to her wages, the
wife had no right to sue for her earnings or make an enforceable
contract for employment and therefore continued to be subject to
the economic control of her husband. 61 In 1911 the Michigan supreme court granted an injunction sought by a husband to prevent
his wife from operating a business in competition with him. 02 The
court held: "The husband, being of sufficient ability, is bound in
law to afford to his wife support reasonably consistent with his own
means and station. As a necessary corollary to this proposition, it
follows that the husband as a matter of law is entitled to the services
and society of his wife. This right has been affirmed many times
in our own State." 63
Apparently in reaction to this holding, the Michigan legislature
passed the 1911 Act, which granted married women the right to contract and sue on their own behalf to obtain their earnings. 04 This
law thus freed a married woman from the control of her husband
in the area of employment, and she became "entitled to all her earnings resulting from her personal efforts." 0 u It was not long, how59. See Howe v. North, 69 Mich. 272, 37 N.W. 213 (1888). But see Showman
v. Lee, 79 Mich. 653, 658, 44 N.W. 1061, 1063 (1891). The Michigan court has
held, however, that if a married woman neglects to assert the defense in a suit against
her "and suffers the case to go on to judgment against her, and still more, suffers
the judgment to stand, the circumstance that she was not originally bound will not
suffice to render the judgment void." Wilson v. Coolidge, 42 Mich. 112, 114, 3 N.W.
285, 287 (1879).
60. See Johnson v. Sutherland, 39 Mich. 579 (1878). This rule was continued
under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305(b), MICH. COMP. LA.ws § 440.3305
(1970), which provides: ''To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he
takes the instrument free from .•• (2) all defenses of any party to the instrument
with whom the holder has not dealt except . . . (b) such other incapacity, or duress,
or illegality of the transaction, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity."
Comment 5 to this section indicates, "If under the local law the effect is to render
the obligation of the instrument entirely null and void, the defense may be asserted
against a holder in due course. If the effect is merely to render the obligation voidable at the election of the obliger, the defense is cut off."
61. Glover v. Alcott, 11 Mich. 470 (1863). See In re Mayer's Estate, 210 Mich.
188, 191, 177 N.W. 488, 489 (1920).
62. Root v. Root, 164 Mich. 638, 130 N.W. 194 (1911).
63. 164 Mich. at 645, 130 N.W. at 196.
64. MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 557.ll (1970) provides:
Each and every married woman in the state of Michigan shall be absolutely entitled to have, hold, own, retain and enjoy any and all earnings acquired by any
such married woman as the result of her personal efforts; and to sell or otherwise dispose of any and all such earnings, and to make contracts in relation
thereto to the same extent that any such married woman could have or do if
unmarried.
See In re Mayer's Estate, 210 Mich. 188, 177 N.W. 488 (1920).
65. In re Snow's Estate, 321 Mich. 127, 130, 32 N.W.2d 364, 365 (1948).
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ever, before the Michigan supreme court imposed a significant limitation upon the right of a married woman to her earnings. In Gregory v. Oakland Motor Car Co., 66 a husband sued for the loss of his
wife's domestic services as a result of an accident allegedly caused
by the defendant's employee. The court disagreed with the defendant's assertion that the 1911 statute barred a husband's recovery for
his wife's services and held:
[T]he statute means that all earnings acquired or service performed
by her as the result of her personal efforts in any separate business
carried on by her in her own behalf, or any services performed by her
for others than her husband, belong to her; but that her husband is
entitled to her labor, companionship, society, and assistance in discharge of those duties and obligations which arise out of the marriage
relation, and that these belong to him. 67

The court, evidently concerned about disrupting the traditional structure of the marital relation, insisted that the 1911 statute did not
intend to put a married woman's "domestic duties and labor, performed in and around her home for her family, upon a pecuniary
basis, nor . . . to classify such duties as services, nor to permit her
to recover damages for loss of ability to perform them." 68 Since the
wife's services in the home are the traditional quid pro quo of the
husband's duty of support, granting her the right to earnings for her
domestic services would have resulted in a major change in the law
of domestic relations and a much broader change in the status of
women than the court was willing to espouse. Although the court
sought to protect a married woman's separate property from her husband, it was not prepared to effect legal reforms that would threaten
her traditional role as housekeeper. Thus, the court's interpretation
of the 1911 Act once again emphasized the protective, rather than
emancipatory, nature of Michigan's married women's property legislation.
The last of the three statutes that constitute the Michigan Married Women's Property Act was enacted in 1917 to expand a wife's
power to contract jointly with her husband. Although under the
1855 Act a married woman could contract jointly with her husband
if the consideration went solely to her separate estate/1 9 she could
not be held liable on a contract if the consideration went either to
her husband's separate estate70 or to their joint estate.71 Thus in
66. 181 Mich. 101, 147 N.W. 614 (1914).
67. 181 Mich. at 110, 147 N.W. at 617.
68. Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich. 304, 313, 151 N.W. 724, 727
(1915).
69. Kies v. Walworth, 250 Mich. 34,229 N.W. 519 (1930).
70. Fisk v. Mills, 104 Mich. 433, 62 N.W. 559 (1895); Littlefield v. Dingwall,
71 Mich. 223, 39 N.W. 38 (1888).
71. See Jarzembinski v. Plodowski, 225 Mich. 104, 195 N.W. 681 (1923) (wife
held not liable on a note for payment on a house jointly owned); Schlatterer v. Nick-
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Caldwell v. Jones, 12 the court, stating that "[i]t is not enough, to
charge a married woman upon her executory contract, that there is
consideration which would support a promise at the common law,
or that the contract indirectly inures to her benefit," 73 held that a
woman could not be liable on a joint note that she and her husband
had given for a horse owned by them jointly. The 1917 Act enabled
a married woman to become liable on such joint contracts with her
husband to the extent of their joint estate even though the consideration did not run solely to her separate estate. u The Act, however,
odemus, 51 Mich. 628, 17 N.W. 210 (1883) (promissory note given for judgment
against husband and wife jointly held to be invalid as to the wife).
72. 115 Mich. 129, 73 N.W. 129 (1897).
73. 115 Mich. at 130, 73 N.W. at 129.
74. MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 557.51-.55 (1970) provides:
. . . Sec. 1. The common law disability of married women to make and
enter into the class or kind of contracts hereinafter specified in section 2, is
hereby abrogated and abolished.
. . . Sec. 2. Hereafter married women shall be possessed of the power and
capacity, and it shall be competent for them to bind and makes [make] them•
selves jointly liable with their husbands upon any written instrument as hereinafter provided. Said liability to extend, however, only to the property described
in the following section.
• . . Sec. 3. Hereafter the real estate of the husband and wife owned by
them as tenants by entirety, or the real estate acquired by either as survivor of
the other, or in the event of divorce the interest of either in real estate which
was previously owned by them as tenants by the entirety, shall be liable to
seizure and sale on execution, and all personal property and choses in action
owned by husband and wife jointly with right of survivorship therein, shall be
subject to writ of garnishment and all other process provided by law, in satisfaction of any judgment which has been recovered against the persons who were
at the time of the execution of such written instrument husband and wife jointly
or the survivor upon any instrument signed by both. In case the wife is the
survivor, or in case the husband and wife have been divorced prior to the recovery of the judgment, a judgment against the wife may be satisfied only out of
such property.
• • . Sec. 4. Such judgment or decree shall be enforced in all respects as
now provided by law, except this, that in all cases where such liability is sought
to be enforced as against the real estate of the husband and wife owned by them
jointly as tenants by entirety or the crops, rents, profits or proceeds thereof or
taken therefrom, or any personal property or choses in action owned by the husband and wife jointly with right of survivorship therein, the judgment or decree
shall recite and it shall be the duty of the court to determine in such suit or
proceeding whether such judgment or decree is rendered upon any written instrument and whether the parties defendant in such suit or proceeding and against
whom such judgment or decree is rendered, were at the date of delivery of such
instrument husband and wife, naming them, which recital of fact for the
guidance of the officer shall be endorsed upon any writ of execution or other
process issued thereon or for the collection thereof, which recital shall be conclusive as against the husband and wife and authorize the enforcement of such
judgment or decree as against all property subject to the satisfaction thereof by
virtue of this act.
. . . Sec. 5. The provisions of this act shall not be construed to apply to
any property otherwise exempted under the constitution or laws of this state.
(Footnote omitted.)
Interpreting the Act, the Michigan supreme court has held that no special form
of consideration is necessary, Rossman v. Hutchinson, 289 Mich. 577, 286 N.W. 835
(1939), nor is it necessary for a creditor to proceed against the husband's separate
estate before proceeding against the joint estate. Binne v. Bench, 302 Mich, 327,
4 N.W.2d 674 (1942).
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also limited this newly granted right. It required that her liability
could only be founded "upon a written instrument, [and could extend] only to joint and entirety property, enforceable under a judgment reciting that such parties were husband and wife at the time
of their execution and delivery of such instrument . . . ." 75 The
statute thus fulfilled the dual purposes of allowing creditors to levy
upon jointly held property and protecting the married woman's separate estate. 76
The effect of the three married women's statutes was thus to allow a married woman to contract: (1) in relation to her sole and
separate estate; (2) in relation to her earnings for services rendered
outside the home; and (3) jointly with her husband to the extent
of their joint estate. 77 Because a married woman's ability to contract was "solely the product of statutory sanction," 78 the common
law remained in effect, and married women were legally disabled
from making enforceable contracts in those areas not covered by the
statutes of 1855, 1911, and 1917. It is clear that the statutes did
not abolish all the disabilities of coverture. 79 They were not designed to give married women complete contractual equality with
men and single women, but rather to protect their separate estates.
No further changes in the law of married women's contractual
rights were effected for over forty-five years despite the recognition
by at least some segments of the legal community that the imposition
of contractual disabilities was no longer supported by public policy
considerations. As one early commentator stated:
It seems needless ,to suggest that the wife should be given the
same power to bind herself by contract that the husband enjoys. Her
common-law immunity from liability on her promises was never regarded as a privilege or protection, but rather as the natural consequence of total incapacity. The wife neither needs nor desires privilege or protection today. To restrict her power to contract on either
theory is hardly consistent with modem standards. 80
75. United States v. O'Hara, 46 F. Supp. 780, 782 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
76. The Act originally required the inclusion in the joint contract of a clause in
which the wife acknowledged that she was freely entering into the agreement without
duress. This provision was eliminated in 1929. No. 287, [1929] Mich. Pub. Acts
746.
77. See Vansyckle, supra note 58, at 17.
78. Honigman, Tenancy by Entirety in Michigan, 5 MICH. ST. B.J. *249, *268
(1926).
79. See Sierra v. Minnear, 341 Mich. 182, 67 N.W.2d 115 (1954); Gillespie v.
Beecher, 94 Mich. 374, 54 N.W. 167 (1892). Cf. Florer, supra note 38, at *99:
"In the general attitude toward the rights and liabilities of married women under their
contracts in Michigan today it is a common assumption that their common law disabilities are almost, if not entirely, removed by statute. • . • It would be only a natural assumption that married women in Michigan have been relieved of their disabilities in the field of contracts. Such is not the case."
80. 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS§ 152, at 36 (1935).
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In this regard, Michigan lagged far behind the rest of the states, most
of which had long before granted to married women contractual
powers equivalent to those of men and single women. 81 AB a result,
into the 1960's married women in Michigan remained legally unable
to exercise full contractual powers.
In 1961 Michigan convened a constitutional convention to redraft the entire state constitution. 82 Among the proposed changes
to the 1908 constitution that were considered at length were two provisions of great significance to the rights of married women. The
first of these was a proposal to add an equal protection clause to
the constitution and to include sex among the prohibited bases of
classification. 83 Although an equal protection clause was eventually
approved by the convention, classification on the basis of sex was
not among its prohibitions. 84 The second proposal was to amend
the married women's property provision of the 1908 constitution.
The provision, finally approved by the convention as article 10, sec.tion 1, of the 1963 constitution, did change the existing constitution's
provision by adding the phrase: "The disabilities of coverture as to
property are abolished." 85 However, because of the ambiguity of this
phrase, 86 it is necessary to examine the legislative history to ascertain
its intended effect on married women's rights.
Although Proposal 26-the proposal to include sex among the
prohibited bases of classification in the equal protection clause-was
not approved by the constitutional convention, the history of its consideration provides valuable insight into the concerns and attitudes
of the convention's delegates on the issue of women's rights. Upon
its introduction, the proposal met with opposition from a number of
81. As of 1969, only ten other states placed limitations on married women's contractual capacities. See L. KANowrrz, supra note 12, at 55.
82. See OFFICIAL RECORD OF nm 1961 MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
[hereinafter CoNsnnmONAL CONVENTION].
83. Committee Proposal 26 read: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion,
sex or national origin. The legislature shall implement this section by appropriate
legislation." Id. at 2887-88.
84. See MICH. CoNST. art. 1, § 2.
85. The entire section reads:
The disabilities of coverture as to property are abolished. The real and personal
estate of every woman acquired before marriage and all real and personal property to which she may afterwards become entitled shall be and remain the estate
and property of such woman, and shall not be liable for the debts, obligations
or engagements of her husband, and may be dealt with and disposed of by her
as if she were unmarried. Dower may be relinquished or conveyed as provided
by law.
The first and last sentences are new to the 1963 constitution; otherwise the language
is essentially the same as article 16, section 8, of the 1908 constitution.
86. See Nord, The Michigan Constitution of 1963, 10 WAYNE L. RBv. 309, 361
(1964).
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delegates who feared the abolition of protective legislation.
gate Katherine Cushman, a leader of this opposition, stated:

89

Dele-

[W]hen sex is coupled so closely to this area where we know almost
absolutely that all classification is illegal, the result must be to thrust
on the courts the proposition that the convention intended all classification with respect to sex, no matter how reasonable it may appear to
be, to be unconstitutional under Michigan Supreme Law. The result
might well be to damage or destroy the capacity of the legislature to
enact protective legislation for women, and it would imperil the constitutionality of legislation already on the books. 87

Another opponent, Delegate Dorothy Judd, added: "Being women,
we want equality with men, but also want our special privileges
too." 88 The proposal's supporters did not respond by defending the
need for sexual equality, but by asserting that the proposal would
accommodate "reasonable" sex-based classifications and that therefore the mere inclusion of the word sex in the equal protection clause
would not prevent the enactment of all protective legislation. 89 On
this basis, the proposal's advocates were able to garner sufficient support to enable it to pass its first reading. 90
By the time of its second reading, however, the women who had
originally opposed Proposal 26 had gained the support of a sufficient
number of male delegates to block reapproval of the original proposal. Delegate William Ford stated: "[T]here are numerous reasons why this is one form of discrimination that should be continued
in the form in which it has evolved over a period of time and that
we are ta1dng a risk here with no positive suggestion, by anyone that
I have heard, of the benefits to be derived that would outweigh the
possible harm that might result." 91 Remarks such as these clearly
indicate the general satisfaction of the proposal's opponents with society's extant sex-based discrimination and their great reluctance to
move, even incrementally, toward equality.
In response to this opposition, the supporters of the proposal
stressed their belief that the law should permit sex-based classifications. As Delegate Ann Donnelly commented: "[T]o take a quote
that was given me from Oliver Wendell Holmes, he stated that it
would take more than the nineteenth amendment to convince him
that there was no difference between men and women. I think
the courts and everybody else can take judicial notice of a few
facts. " 92 To ensure her interpretation, Delegate Donnelly introduced, and the convention adopted, an amendment to the proposal
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

supra note 82, at 2888.
Id. at 2888.
See, e.g., id. at 2889 (remarks of Delegate Harold Norris).
Id. at 2891.
Id. at 2912.
Id. at 2913.
CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVBNTION,
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that added: "This shall not be construed to prevent reasonable classification for the protection of women." 93
Despite the acceptance of the amended proposal, a number of
delegates sought to block any inclusion of the word sex in the equal
protection clause. Delegate William Cudlip quoted a letter from
Professor Paul Kauper of The University of Michigan Law School:
I feel that to include sex along with race, religion and national origin
as an impermissible basis for discrimination in the enjoyment or exercise of civil or political rights would be a mistake. I say this not because I think a legislature should be free to subject women to discriminatory laws in the enjoyment of political and civil rights but because
the use of the word sex in the context of the equal protection provision, along with race, religion and national origin suggests on its face
that sex cannot be made a basis for legislative classification.
. . . [Although the inclusion of the Donnelly amendment] would
help to meet the problem of classification, . . . it would be directed
only to the end of permitting protective police legislation and thus
would deal with only a part of the problem of classification by sex. 94
Delegate Cudlip amplified on the reasoning implicit in Professor
Kauper's analysis: "Women need to be discriminated against for
their benefit many, many times. The whole point here is that this
language, as developed, does not go far enough to protect them under many, many situations arising because of the differences of nature."95 The supporters of Proposal 26, rather than responding to
the argument that women need to be discriminated against, 00 reiterated that the proposal was not intended to grant women equal rights.
As Delegate Lillian Hatcher, one of the proposal's strongest backers,
stated:
[T]here are those who seem to think that this language will remove
the rights of women. . . . We are not saying equal rights. We're
saying equal protection of the rights we have. And there's a sea of
difference between equal rights and equal protection. I am opposed
to the equal rights amendment, as such, as the women on the hill
have been fighting for a number of years. But I am in favor of equal
protection because even ·though I'm not an attorney, I know that
there's a big difference between men and women. 97
Despite this response, the proposal's opponents were able to persuade a significant majority of the delegates that it was necessary
93. Id. at 2915.
94. Id. at 3089.

95. Id. at 3089.
96. But see id. at 3092 (statement of Ann Donnelly): "I am very, very, very
mindful of the discrimination against women. I have found no discrimination for
women-or against them-for their protection yet. I think the underlying motive
behind this is not to protect women. . . . I don't think they [the amendments to
strike] will protect women. I think they aid in discrimination against them."
91. Id. at 3090 (laughter deleted).
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to permit not only protective legislation, but all legislation discriminating against women for their benefit. Thus, the word sex was
ultimately eliminated from the equal protection clause. 98 This legislative history indicates unequivocally that the delegates to the convention cast their votes for protection and not for equality. Even
the minority that supported Proposal 26 did not seek to grant married women equal rights. Instead of making progress in the area
of women's rights, the convention thus explicitly approved the existing legal status of Michigan women. 99
The attitudes and beliefs expressed in the debate on the equal
protection provision provide an appropriate background for an analysis of the deliberations of the constitutional convention on the
women's property provision. The debate on the women's property
provision was conducted at four general stages. Initially, language
was added to the 1908 provision to broaden its scope considerably.
The convention then considered but rejected a move to delete the
constitutional provision entirely. Next, the convention reinstated the
language of the 1908 constitution. Finally, the convention adopted
a more restrictive version of the initial amended proposal. The result of this vacillation was the enactment of a provision that did no
more than constitutionalize the existing Married Women's Property
Act.
Although the original proposal presented to the convention retained the language of article 16, section 8, of the 1908 constitution, 100 it was amended immediately upon reaching the floor of the
convention. The amendment proposed to make the language of the
provision correspond with section 1 of the 1855 Married Women's
Act101 and added the words: "The disabilities of coverture are abolished."102 Despite its potentially far-reaching implications, this provision, at least initially, received little attention. 103 Rather, the new
proposal's sponsors concentrated on the need to incorporate the protections of the married women's acts into the constitution to ensure
98. Id. at 30!>2. The final vote on the motion to strike was 82 to 48. Id.
99. In contrast, the convention record shows great concern on the part of delegates for the problems of racial discrimination. The convention members expressed pride in their adoption of a proposal that they hoped would contribute to the
goal of racial equality. See, e.g., id. at 3088-89 (statement of William Cudlip). It
is clear that the women's movement had not made a similar impact on the convention.
100. See note 85 supra.
101. MICH. COMP. LAws § 557.1 (1970), quoted in note 34 supra.
102. CoNSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 82, at 2437.
103. If all the disabilities of coverture were abolished, it is clear that much more
than property rights would be affected and that the constitution would go far beyond
the existing law. It is unclear from the record why these implications were not discussed at this juncture. As shall be seen, when the potential impact of the phrase
was later realized, the convention was quiok to modify it See note 117 and text
at notes 117-19 infra.
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married women the right to deal with their own property. 104 They
argued that the amended proposal was necessary because "[t]he
married woman's statute is further extended than [the] present constitutional language."105
Upon the initial adoption of this amendment, however, a motion
to strike the entire proposal was introduced,106 thus provoking a debate on the need for any women's property provision in the constitution.107 The arguments propounded against the amended proposal
clearly demonstrate that the delegates did not perceive the provision
as altering married women's contractual rights. Instead, a number
of the proposal's opponents apparently obje~ted to the very concept
of a married woman's separate estate.108 Delegate David Upton argued that "both the property of the man and the woman should be
common property among their family." 109 Delegate Richard Austin
concurred, asking why it was "necessary to write this type of discrimination for married women into the constitution." 110 On the other
hand, some delegates thought the provision was unnecessary because they thought that the married women's acts extended further
than the proposed constitutional provision. 111
The supporters of the amended proposal focused on the importance of providing constitutional protection for a married woman's statutory right to maintain a separate estate free from liability
104. See, e.g., CoNsTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 82, at 2438 (statement
of Delegate J. Edward Hutchinson):
Let me say this: frankly, at one time I was of the opinion that we didn't need
to say anything at all about this in the constitution because, certainly, the legislature by statute has gone further than the constitution went, and there is no
doubt but what the legislature could provide all of this by statute law. But then
-rll have to confess this-I became a little apprehensive and fearful lest, if the
constitution is silent upon this matter, that not only the lady delegates in this
convention would become aroused, but that perhaps a majority of the potential
voters of the state, who are women, would become alarmed and not favor the
work of this convention when, as a matter of fact, their rights really rest upon
statute law and judge made law, and this constitutional provision is more or less
declaratozy. However, yielding to the political practicalities of the situation and
recognizing that from that standpoint we needed to say something, at that point
I was ambitious to make it as broad as we could possibly make it.
I think that if we write into the constitution that the disabilities of coverture
are abolished, then the rights of a married woman will be the same as the rights
of an unmarried woman, and she will be able to do evezything with her property
that she could do if she were unmarried. At the same time I do not think that
her privileges are denied her. By this provision she will gain all her rights and
will not lose any of her special privileges.
105. Id. at 2439 (statement of Delegate Ann Donnelly).
106. Id. at 2439.
107. Id. at 2439-43.
108. Such arguments ignored, of course, the fact that the Married Women's Property Act already guaranteed married women the right to a separate estate, See text
at notes 34-36 supra.
109. CoNSITroTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 82, at 2439.
110. Id. at 2439.
111. Id. at 2441. Delegate Mahinske seems to have passed over, as did the initial supporters of the amendment, the potentially broad impact of the first clause,
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for her husband's debts. Rather than discussing the broad language
of the provision's first sentence, they responded to the doubts about
the necessity of a constitutional provision guaranteeing married
women's extant statutory rights. Delegate Ann Donnelly declared:
To say that married women do not need protection is to ignore the
facts of life.
. . . [l]t is very necessary that this be retained in the constitution
because of the problems which are inherent in conveying property;
whether they will mortgage or not; whether they will be liable for
their husband's debts.
. . . To remove any control from a married woman to protect her
rights and her children's rights by knocking this language out and
laughingly feeling that we have covered it in another article is, I
think, very erroneous. 112

Delegate Katherine Cushman concurred: "The common law provides for a disadvantaged position for women, and there is no doubt
in my mind that they need this type of protection." 113 Some of the
men supporting the proposal viewed it as necessary to protect married women from their own frailties, the same rationale that underlay the early married women's acts. Delegate Joseph Snyder stated:
I think that we have a responsibility as delegates to the convention to
protect one of the most basic and fundamental divisions of American
life-that is the family. I feel that as males and females, brother and
sister delegates to this convention, we are obligated to put into this
constitution something that will protect the focal center of family life,
the woman.
. . . I say this with all seriousness: that because of the makeup,
the biological makeup of people, women are more trusting, and once
the marriage vows are consummated, they are willing ,to share and
share equally, and sometimes give away some of the rights that they
have. And if they are not fully protected, there are those who would
take advantage of this. 114

Other men offered their support for the amended proposal primarily
out of deference to the women. Thus, even though one delegate
believed the proposal to be unnecessary, he stated: "To me we do
have to respect and honor the women. This is strictly for their protection, and I am willing to go along with it." 115 Another delegate
concluded: "[I]t seems like the women have won these things
through years of work, and I think we should give it back to them
and leave it in the constitution-at least, the original wording, the
way it is in the present constitution." 116
112. Id. at 2440.
113. Id. at 2443.
114. Id. at 2440.
115. Id. at 2443 (statement of Richard Kuhn).
116. Id. at 2443 (statement of William Glover).
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These statements by the proposal's backers indicate that their
support stemmed from their desire to protect married women. They
sought to preserve married women's separate estates and to insulate
those estates from their husband's debts and the effects of their own
trusting natures. The delegates concentrated upon the separate estate provisions and generally ignored the effect of the first clause. 117
No consideration was given to the elimination of the remaining contractual disabilities of married women. Thus, on the basis of the
delegates' desire to conf~r constitutional protection to a married
woman's separate estate, the motion to strike the entire proposal was
defeated. 118
The third step in the consideration of the provision began when
a number of delegates reconsidered the new language, particularly
the potentially far-reaching consequences of the first clause, and introduced an amendment to resubstitute the language of the 1908
constitution for the amended proposal. 119 One delegate suggested
that the change was important because "when we speak of the word
'disabilities' with respect to the rights of married women, we should
remember that these are not always things which are disadvantageous to the ladies, even under the old strict common law." 120 In
support of this position, he quoted Blackstone's infamous passage:
"These are the chief legal effects of marriage during the coverture;
upon which we may observe, that even the disabilities which the wife
lies under are for the most part intended for her protection and
benefit: so great a favorite is the female sex of the laws of England."121
As a lone progressive voice, Delegate Milton Higgs protested
against eliminating the amended proposal. Recognizing the proposal's potential impact in expanding married women's rights, he exhorted the convention to overturn the old rule:
[A] married woman has no right under the law of Michigan actually
to enter into joint and several liability with her husband. If she signs
a joint and several note, a judgment rendered would have to be restricted to joint property ~nd it could not be a several liability on her
117. A few delegates did focus on the potential impact of abolishing the disabilities of coverture. See, e.g., id. at 2442 (statement of Melvin Nord) ("Everything
that follows that first sentence, relates to property. But the first sentence seems to
be much broader than that, and nobody has been able to give an exact statement
of what the first sentence will do"), 2441 (statement of Edward Hutchinson)
("[T]he rights accorded to married women by virtue of the married women's act are
broader in scope than is the language of the present constitution, and the proposal
now before you would abolish all of the disabilities of coverture and in that regard
would be broader than the present married women's act").
118. Id. at 2443.
119. Id. at 3001.
120. Id. at 3002 (statement of Eugene Wanger).
121. Id., quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *445.
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part. In other words, a married woman is prevented from applying
her separate estate in this particular way.
. . . [T]here have been so many statutory inroads toward reducing the disabilities of coverture that it would seem desirable to me
that we should make this forthright statement that the disabilities of
coverture are abolished, and actually give women a more complete
unrestricted right to deal with their separate estate. 122
A majority of the convention, however, did not find these arguments
persuasive and, when directly confronted with the proposal's potential impact, voted to accept the resubstitution of the 1908 language.12a
The final step in the consideration of the married women's property provision occurred when an amendment was offered that essentially reinstated the initial amended version of the provision. This
new proposal was a result of the dissatisfaction of a number of delegates with the mere restatement of the 1908 constitution's language,
which did not even cover the entire Married Women's Property Act.
It differed from the initial amended version in two ways: A new
final sentence was added stating, "Dower may be relinquished or
conveyed as provided by law," and the first sentence was modified
to read, "The disabilities of coverture as to property are abolished."124 In light of the numerous previous statements about the
importance of guaranteeing to married women the right to their separate estates while still maintaining the protections of the married
women's acts, it seems clear that the new language was, at the most,
intended to incorporate the acts into the constitution. 125 This conclusion is strongly supported by statements of many of the delegates.
Delegate Stanley Everett remarked:
[l]t is unlikely that the legislature would turn back the pages of history and put women back in that place, but we are doing 2 things:
we are enunciating as a principle that these disabilities may never arise
again in the state of Michigan, and we are affording those who have
some questions about it that the legislature never can take this away.
. . . [T]his is an historical declaration of women's freedoms and
to many of us, at least, it is important that the constitution reiterate it
and it would be harmful for us to take it out. 126
122. CoNSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 82, at 3002-03.
123. Id. at 3003.
124. Id. at 3149-50 (emphasis added).
125. It is unclear whether the amended version was intended to include all three
married women's acts in the constitution. The reference to property might mean that
only section 1 of the 1855 Act dealing with a married woman's right to obtain
and dispose of her separate estate is constitutionalized. The provision might also include, however, the contractual rights granted by section 4, since they cover contracts
that relate to a married woman's separate estate. See statute cited in note
34, supra.
126. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 82, at 3150.
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Another delegate added: "[11he first sentence now makes its
meaning clear so that it will not affect anything except property." 127
Thus explained, the amendment was adopted128 and subsequently
became article 10, section 1, of the new constitution. 129
The record of the constitutional convention demonstrates that the
delegates, motivated by a perception that women generally, and
married women in particular, required special legislative protection,
were concerned with guaranteeing married women limited existing
rights with relation to their separate estates rather than with granting
them additional rights. Thus the new married women's property
provision was intended to do no more than constitutionalize the preexisting statutory rights created by the Married Women's Property
Act. The record also makes clear, however, that it was not the convention's intent to constitutionalize the remaining common-law disabilities. As Delegate Herman Dehnke stated:
There isn't anything here whatever to suggest that this proposed
amendment will be construed in any other way . . . [than] as a
floor, as a limitation below which the legislature cannot go without
any restriction on how much farther it may go in promoting the purpose of the entire amendment.
. . . We are merely raising the floor by what we are putting in
here, and the legislature can build from there on. 130

,I

Although after the adoption of the 1963 constitution married
women in Michigan remained unable to bind their individual property unless the contract related to their separate estate, the Michigan
legislature retained the power to enact laws extending married women's contractual rights.
No further laws affecting the contractual rights of married
women were passed, however, until the enactment in 1974 of the
Michigan equal credit opportunity act. 131 This act, which prohibits
credit discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status, fails to
eliminate expressly the remaining disabilities of coverture. However, these limitations upon married women's contractual rights are
likely to have an adverse effect upon their ability to obtain credit.
Thus, it is important to determine what effect the remaining contractual disabilities have on the ability of married women to obtain
credit, whether the disabilities conflict with the mandate of the new
credit act, and, if conflicts do exist, how they should be resolved. 182
127. Id. at 3151 (statement of Delegate Herman Dehnke).
128. Id.
129. The final language is quoted in note 85 supra.
130. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 82, at 2443.
131. No. 246, [1974] Mich. Pub. & Local Acts - (codified at MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 750.147a (Supp. 1975) ), quoted in note 11 supra.
132. It has been suggested that a married woman may be unable to contract for
necessities since her husband may be liable for such contracts. Michigan Consumers
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The existing limitations on a married woman's contractual rights
can impair her attainment of equal credit opportunity by preventing
her from, for example, acquiring credit on joint purchases with her
husband, acting as a surety, or obtaining credit for a corporation in
which she has an interest.
The problem of a married woman seeking to obtain credit with
her husband for a joint purchase is illustrated by City Finance Co.
v. Kloostra, 133 the first case to give thorough consideration to the
effect of the 1963 Michigan constitution on the remaining contractual disabilities of coverture. 134 Kloostra involved a suit by a finance
company against a married woman who had co-signed a note with
her husband to purchase an automobile. Before payments on the
note had been completed, the couple was divorced and the husband
departed with the car. The finance company then commenced suit
against the wife. Ms. Kloostra sought to defend on the ground that
the consideration did not relate to her separate estate and that, as
a consequence, the judgment should be satisfied only from the
property previously owned jointly by the couple.135 The trial judge,
however, held that article 10, section 1, of the 1963 constitution had
superseded the married women's acts with the result that Ms. Kloostra was individually liable on the contract.136 On appeal, the third
division of the Michigan court of appeals, rejecting this constitutional analysis, determined that the reasons given by the supporters
of the married women's property provision were "inconsistent with
an intent to supersede the married women's property act." 137 The
court therefore held that a married woman could still assert the common law of coverture as a defense to a contract where the consideration did not relate to her separate estate. 138
.
The analysis employed by the court in reaching this result is troublesome. As has already been stated, the convention sought to limit
the impact of the first clause of article 10, section 1, by adding the
words "as to property" to ensure that the provision would not extend
beyond the married women's acts. However, rather than finding a
limitation in these words, the court distinguished between the disabilities and the defenses of coverture. It stated that the inability
Council, Women and Credit 7-8, Sept. 27, 1972. The Michigan supreme court, however, has held the purchase of necessities will bind a married woman's separate
estate. See Hirshfield v. Waldron, 83 Mich. 116, 47 N.W. 239 (1890); Campbell
v. White, 22 Mich. 178 (1871). See also Florer, supra note 38, at *103.
133. 47 Mich. App. 276, 209 N.W.2d 498 (1973).
134. But see Detroit Newspaper Indus. Credit Union v. McDonald, 9 Mich. App.
146, 151, 156 N.W.2d 62, 65 (1967) (dictum).
135. See MICH. CoMP. LAws § 557.53 (1970), quoted in note 74 supra.
136. 47 Mich. App. at 277, 209 N.W.2d at 499.
137. 47 Mich. App. at 285, 209 N.W.2d at 503.
138. 47 Mich. App. at 288, 209 N.W.2d at 505.
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of married women in Michigan to bind their separate estates unless
the consideration relates to the separate estate was
in reality, a "disability of coverture", for it exists only because the
common law denied married women the capacity to make binding
contracts and because our Legislature has not completely abrogated
the common law. However, because the same incapacity can be
used to avoid personal liability once a contract has been made, it is
considered by many to be a "defense of coverture" and as such a protection for married women. 139

The court concluded that this distinction was essential to effect the
intent of the constitutional convention to preserve the defenses of
coverture as a protection for married women while abrogating coverture's disabilities.
The distinction between disabilities and defenses is, however,
without support in Michigan case law. Although the Michigan supreme court has sometimes referred to the disabilities of coverture
as defenses of coverture when the disability was asserted in defense
to a suit, it has never been suggested that the two terms can be separated and viewed as distinct concepts. The distinction also lacks any
logical foundation. It appears that the court was suggesting that
while a defense of coverture would enable a married woman to assert her incapacity as a defense to a contract action, a disability of
coverture would prevent her from suing on a contract for her own
benefit by allowing the other party to assert her incapacity as a defense. Thus, the only difference between a disability of coverture
and a defense of coverture would be the time during the legal process, and by whom, the married woman's contractual incapacity could
be asserted. This distinction, however, begs the question: That a
married woman cannot sue to enforce her contract is not the disability but rather merely one result of the disability. Moreover,
elimination of one of the results of the disability does not abrogate
the disability itself. The disability is thus not properly classified as
a limitation on someone's defenses in court; instead, it is a limitation
on the ability of a married woman to contract and bind herself in
the first place.
A further problem that the Kloostra court's distinction creates is
that, by permitting the "defense of coverture" while abolishing the
"disability," the contract would become in essence voidable at the
option of the married woman. While a married woman could sue,
she could not be sued absent her consent. Yet, if the contract were
merely voidable, a married woman who was the maker of a negotiable instrument would be liable to a holder in due course notwithstanding that the contract was not within the purview of the married
139. 47 Mich. App. at 285, 209 N.W.2d at 503.
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women's acts. 140 Such a result would clearly contravene the court's
apparent purpose to protect married women's estates from such actions.141 Finally, as a matter of fundamental policy, it is necessary
to realize that the disabilities and defenses of coverture are inextricably part of the same concept. In exchange for the "right'' to
assert legal incapacity as a defense, married women must forgo the
benefits resulting from the ability to bind themselves legally. By
focusing on the illusory distinction between the disabilities and defenses of coverture, the Kloostra court was able to avoid consideration of the basic policies underlying the married women's acts. Thus,
·the court failed to confront the essential question whether married
women should be granted the contractual freedoms enjoyed by the
rest of Michigan's adult population.
Although the protective spirit of the Kloostra opinion may have
resulted from the court's sympathy for the particular defendant's
plight, such decisions can have profound effects on other married
women seeking credit. Thus, a couple may seek to obtain credit
jointly to purchase an item for which neither of their salaries is alone
sufficient. Their combined income, however, may be enough to
warrant the extension of credit. If both parties were unconstrained
by contractual disabilities, the creditor would presumably be willing
to grant credit to the couple on the basis of their joint and several
liability. However, since a married woman could at any time deposit
her earnings in a separate account, thus making them a part of her
separate estate and insulating them from garnishment and attachment, it is probable that a potential lender would greatly discount
her income in computing the couple's available assets. Thus, in exchange for the protection offered by Kloostra, married women are
likely to have their own incomes greatly discounted when applying
for joint credit. Such· a situation seems to conflict with the clear
mandate of the Michigan equal credit opportunity act. As a result
of being a woman and married, a person would be denied her full
contractual rights and responsibilities and, because of these contractual limitations, she may be denied credit.
These existing contractual disabilities may also impede a married
woman who seeks to become a surety. The married women's acts
do not permit a married woman to bind her separate estate unless
the obligation relates to her separate property. 142 The leading
140. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305(b), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 440.
3305 (1970), quoted in note 60 supra.
141. Indeed, if the Kloostra court had followed through on the implications of
its holding, Ms. K.Ioostra should have been liable on the note in issue. If the note
was merely voidable, the finance company, as a holder in due course, should have
had the right to sue.
142. Nord, supra note 86, at 361.
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Michigan case on the subject is DeVries v. Conklin. 148 In consideration for the discontinuation of the plaintiffs suit on a note made
out to him by a husband, the husband and wife signed a new note.
In a subsequent suit on the second note, the wife defended on the
ground that no consideration related to her separate estate. The
court held that the 1855 act "neither in its terms authorizes a married woman to make herself liable personally for the debt of another,
nor where no consideration moves to her can it be presumptively
for her benefit. It was no part of the design of the statute to relieve
her of common law disabilities for any such purpose." 144 Since the
imposition of liability upon a wife for her husband's debts was precisely the situation that the 1855 statute was intended to prevent,
the court has been strict in its requirement that consideration relate
to the married woman's separate estate. 145 This disability, viewed
as a protection for married women, has continued to be applied in
the twentieth century. 146
This "protection" may have an adverse impact on married
women in a number of ways. Even if a married woman decides that
it is in her and her family's best interests to postpone the collection
of her husband's debt by becoming a surety, the benefit to her separate estate will not be considered direct enough to satisfy the statute.
Since the law presumes that a married woman is incapable of rationally calculating her own self-interests, it effectively makes the calculation for her.
A third situation in which a married woman in Michigan may
be denied equal credit opportunity by her contractual disabilities is
when she seeks to bind herself on a note for the benefit of a corporation in which she is a stockholder.147 This problem is exemplified
by Russel v. People's Savings Bank, 148 in which a married woman
was a stockholder in a corporation that was indebted to a bank. To
prevent consummation of suit by the bank, the woman signed the
corporation's note as a surety. The Michigan supreme court, holding that the indirect benefits to the married woman's separate estate
were not sufficient to bind her, stated that the woman "was not identified with the corporation otherwise than as having an interest in
it; the legal identity of each was distinct, and contracts for the benefit
of the corporate estate were in no sense contracts for the benefit of
the estate of one of its corporators." 149 The court has adhered to
143. 22 Mich. 255 (1871).
144. 22 Mich. at 259.
145. See also West v. Laraway, 28 Mich. 464, 466 (1874).
146. See Dowagiac Natl. Bank v. Maier, 285 Mich. I, 280 N.W. 86 ( 1938).
147. See Honigman, supra note 78, at *269.
148. 39 Mich. 671 (1878).
149. 39 Mich. at 674. Accord, Fitzgerald v. Harry I. Garson Prod., 221 Mich.
88, 90, 190 N.W. 695, 696 (1922).
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this interpretation even in cases where the interest of the married
woman in the corporation's finances was substantial. Thus, in Kirby
v. Orloff, 150 where a married woman was the principal stockholder,
treasurer, and a large creditor of a corporation, the court refused
to enforce a personal note that she had executed to cover a dishonored corporate check. Despite the woman's obvious financial interest in the corporation, the court held: "[W]hen she contracted to
pay the debts of the corporation she was not dealing with reference
to her separate estate. Though she may have been indirectly benefited as a stockholder, she received no consideration affecting her
individual estate." 151 Similarly, in Koengeter v. Holzbaugh, 152 the
court held that even when a married woman was the sole stockholder
of a corporation, she could not be liable since no consideration related to her separate estate. Since creditors of small corporations
often demand that corporate officers assume a personal obligation
on corporate notes, 153 female entrepreneurs may encounter significant difficulties in obtaining credit for their corporations. Over fifty
years ago, the Michigan supreme court recognized that "[m]arried
women are now so frequently engaged in partnership and corporate
business ventures that it may be desirable to further remove the disability created by the common law, but such an action must be taken
by the legislature and not by the courts." 154 Yet, because the Michigan legislature has failed to enact such legislation, married women
remain unable to obtain equal credit in the corporate context, despite the fact that, as one commentator has pointed out, "experience
in the overwhelming majority of states that have removed the wife's
disability to act as her husband's or a third party's surety or guarantor
does not reveal the rise of any special problems or abuse."155
It appears certain that these effects of the limitations upon married women's contractual rights will compel lenders in numerous
cases to deny credit to married women, who are unable to bind
themselves contractually to certain types of obligations. Although
it might be argued that this result-credit discrimination because
of one party's sex and marital status-is not expressly proscribed by
150. 226 Mich. 413, 197 N.W. 371 (1924).
151. 226 Mich. at 416, 197 N.W. at 372.
152. 332 Mich. 280, 50 N.W.2d 778 (1952).
153. J. WHITB & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 13-4, at 405 (1972).
154. Fitzgerald v. Harry I. Garson Prod., 221 Mich. 88, 91; 190 N.W. 695, 696
(1922).
155. L. KANowrrz, supra note 12, at 58. Even if the abrogation of all married
women's contractual disabilities does result in some problems, they "may be dealt
with by many devices short of restricting the wife's contractual capacity." Id. at 58.
For example, traditional contract principles that prevent overreaching in the bargaining process could be applied without assuming that a married woman lacks the capacity to make decisions for herself.
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the equal credit opportunity act because the credit goes not to the
woman directly but, for example, to the note's principal, such an argument is untenable for two reasons. First, the denial of a married
woman's right to be a surety or to assume liability when the consideration goes to her corporation is a denial of credit to her since she
is denied the opportunity to assume the obligation. Although this
may represent an expansive reading of the term credit, it is not inconsistent with the broadly remedial nature of the new credit act.
Second, even if one defines the grant of credit narrowly to mean
the actual dispensation of funds, the language of the credit act does
not specifically require that the proscribed discrimination result in
the denial of credit to any particular person. It merely states that
"[a] person shall not discriminate in extending credit or granting
a loan on the basis of . . . marital status [or] sex . . . ." 160 Thus,
in refusing to extend credit to a corporation because its sole stockholder is a married woman who cannot assume personal liability on a note,
a lender would be denying credit to the corporation on the basis of
sex and marital status. Since the act does not specify upon whose
sex or marital status the proscribed discrimination must be based,
it should not be interpreted as prohibiting credit discrimination only
when the direct recipient of the funds is the person discriminated
against. All that should be required is a direct causal link between
the denial of credit and the sex or marital status of some party.
Thus, it appears that a conflict exists between the credit act and
the requirement of the married women's acts that consideration must
go to a married woman's separate estate to make her contract binding.157 This conflict necessitates a determination of the effect of the
156. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 750.147a(l) (Supp. 1975).
157. Another barrier to full equal credit opportunity is the difficulty a housewife
has in accumulating a separate estate and thus establishing a credit rating in
her own name. Under Michigan common law, the husband is the head of the family,
People v. Sybisloo, 216 Mich. 1, 184 N.W. 416 (1921), and is responsible for the
support of his wife. Howe v. North, 69 Mich. 272, 37 N.W. 213 (1888). In exchange for his duty of support, the wife owes to her husband her services in the
home. The wife has no legal right to recover money for any services she renders
in the home. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 211 Mich. 429, 179 N.W. 256 (1920). Cf. text
at note 67 supra. Thus, a contract for such payments is void both for lack of consideration and as a violation of public policy. Michigan Trust Co. v. Chapin, 106
Mich. 384, 386, 64 N.W. 334, at 334 (1895); Detroit & Security Trust Co. v. Gitre,
254 Mich. 66, 74, 235 N.W. 884, 887 (1931).
These rules, which specifically prevent a housewife from accumulating the kind
of income that would allow her to obtain credit in her own name, run counter to
at least the spirit of the equal credit opportunity act. They do not directly prevent
the granting of equal credit, but their effect impedes the underlying function of the
act. Thus, although it would perhaps be going too far to suggest that the credit act
works a change in the complex law of marital property, the conflict does suggest that
the legislature should give serious consideration to restructuring Michigan's marital
property laws and the law of support to effect the principle of equality that has been
adopted in the equal credit opportunity act. In addition, the Michigan legislature
has ratified the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the U.S. Constitution. House

November 1975]

Married Women's Credit

103

credit act on the remaining disabilities of coverture. As a general
rule, the Michigan supreme court has declared that, in determining
the meaning of a statute, "it is the primary duty of the court to
ascertain, if possible, the intention of the legislature in passing it.
That intention is to be drawn from an examination of the language
of the act itself, the subject-matter under consideration, · and the
scope and purpose of the act." 158 It has emphasized that although
the legislative intention should be ascertained from the language of
the act itself, "[t]he spirit and intention of the statute should prevail
over its strict letter." 159 Thus, the court may consider the occasion
for the statute's enactment in ascertaining the underlying purpose
of the act. 160 The court has also established some specialized rules
of statutory construction: "Where a statute attempts, in derogation
of the common law, to create a liability, we cannot go beyond the
clearly-expressed provisions of the act. Such statutes are not to be
extended or enlarged in their scope by construction."161 Thus,
where a statute is penal in nature, creates a right of action not recognized at common law, or is in derogation of other common-law
rights, it will generally be strictly construed. 162 On the other hand,
the Michigan court has suggested: "When called upon to interpret
social legislation, this Court has sought construction which accorded
both with legislative intent and the stated remedial purpose of the
act in question." 163 The court's policy is therefore to interpret remedial statutes liberally: 164 "A remedial statute is designed to correct an existing law, redress an existing grievance, or introduce regulations conducive to the public good. . . . Such statutes are to be
liberally construed."165
Joint Resolution LLL, 1972 JoURNAL OF nm HousB OF RBPRESENTATIVBS OF nm
STATB OF MICHIGAN 1815 (May 18, 1972); Senate Joint Resolution GG, 1972 JouRNAL OF TIIB SENATE OF nm STATB OF MICHIGAN 1217 (May 22, 1972). Adoption
of the ERA would require the state to restructure its laws governing the marital relation since the sex-based classifications that are now so deeply imbedded in Michigan's
family law would no longer be permissible. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman,
The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women,
80 YALB L.J. 872, 936-54 (1971).
158. In re School Dist. No. 6, 284 Mich. 132, 143, 278 N.W. 792 (1938). See
Ballinger v. Smith, 328 Mich. 23, 30, 43 N.W.2d 49, 53 (1950).
159. Smith v. City Commn., 281 Mich. 235,241,274 N.W. 776, 778 (1937).
160. Bennett v. Michigan Pulpwood Co., 181 Mich. 33, 40, 147 N.W. 490, 492
(1914); Caldwell v. Ward, 83 Mich. 13, 16, 46 N.W. 1024, 1025 (1890).
161. City of Detroit v. Putnam, 45 Mich. 263, 265, 7 N.W. 815, 816 (1881).
162. Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); Risser v. Hoyt,
53 Mich. 185, 192, 18 N.W. 611, 615 (1884).
163. Gauthier v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co., 360 Mich. 510, 527,
104 N.W.2d 182, 190 (1960).
164. See Oakland County Treasurer v. Auditor General, 292 Mich. 58, 290 N.W.
327 (1940).
165. In re School Dist. No. 6, 284 Mich. 132, 144,278 N.W. 792, 797 (1938).
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The equal credit act seems to be both a penal statute and a remedial statute. It is penal to the extent that it grants a cause of
action against creditors that previously was not recognized. Yet, it
is remedial in that it grants expanded rights to women. Faced with
a similar conflict, the Michigan court has held: "A liberal construction for the purpose of the remedy may be indulged, but to the extent that it operates against the offender it must be construed
strictly." 166 Therefore, in determining the effect of the act on married women's contractual rights, it should be construed liberally to
effect its essential purpose-to assure all persons the right to equal
credit opportunity. The language of the Michigan supreme court
in an early case interpreting the Married Women's Act of 1855 is
instructive in this regard: "[T}he statutes on this subject . . . are
to be construed with a view to give them the effect designed by
the legislature, rather than with an effort to retain as much as possible of an old system which they were meant to displace." 167
In order, therefore, to give the act the "effect designed by the
legislature," it is necessary to infer the implied repeal of the remaining contractual disabilities of coverture.rns The act's language demonstrates clearly that the legislature sought to ensure that married
women would be afforded equal opportunity to obtain credit. Strict
enforcement of both the common-law rules that prevent a married
woman from contracting unless the consideration relates directly to
her separate estate and the equal credit mandate of the new Michigan credit law would force lenders to grant credit to women from
whom they could not obtain judgments. Certainly it was not the intent of the legislature to place lenders in such a predicament. In
order to effectuate the legislative intent to ensure equality of credit
opportunity, it is necessary to establish contractual equality. Thus,
the intent to grant married women the right to contract even when
the consideration does not relate to their separate estates must be
inferred from the legislature's actions. 169
166. Robinson v. Harmon, 157 Mich. 276, 278, 122 N.W. 106, 107 (1909).
167. Tillman v. Shackleton, 15 Mich. 447, 457 (1867). Cf. DeVries v. Conklin,
22 Mich. 255 (1871).
168. The legislature has the power to eliminate the remaining disabilities of
coverture. See text at note 130 supra.
169. The Michigan court has been willing to imply a repeal of certain contractual
disabilities without an explicit legislative mandate. See Wolcott v. Patterson, 100
Mich. 227, 58 N.W. 1006 (1894), in which a married woman was held liable on
a contract for an attorney's services in a divorce case. Married women were authorized by statute to bring such suits, and the court found "the right to contract
for such services is necessarily incident to and included in her right to bring suit."
100 Mich. at 299, 58 N.W. at 1007.
In addition, it should be noted that the equal credit bill was introduced soon after
the Kloostra decision, and that case was brought to the attention of the legislators.
Thus, it appears likely that the legislature was aware of the case's implications for
married women seeking credit and that in passing the credit bill the legislature sought
to reverse the case's effect.
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Further support for the inference that the Michigan legislature
intended to abrogate the remaining disabilities of coverture can be
found in its ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. 170 The
amendment, which requires equal treatment of both sexes, would,
if adopted, eliminate any extant disabilities of coverture. The
fundamental inconsistency between the ratification of this amendment and retention of the contractual disabilities of coverture reinforces the conclusion that, when enacting the equal credit opportunity act, the Michigan legislature did not intend to preserve the disabilities.
Although this Note has focused on how the courts should resolve
the conflict between the new equal credit opportunity law and the
remaining disabilities of coverture, the issue is not necessarily one
for the judiciary alone. The legislature should expressly guarantee
that all married women have legal rights equal to those of men and
single women. The Michigan legislature, by approving the Equal
Rights Amendment, has already demonstrated its support for ending outmoded legislation based on the patronizing notion that, because of "[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex," 171 married women must be discriminated
against for their own protection. It is time for the legislature to act
to ensure that married women are no longer denied the- rights accorded the rest of adult society.
170. See note 157 supra.
171. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).

